Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification

Noûs 46 (2) (2012)
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Abstract
In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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2012
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First archival date: 2017-03-27
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