Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?

In Tamar Gendler (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 240 (2013)
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Abstract

I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

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