Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting

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In this paper it is argued that we can have defensible attributions of responsibility without first answering the question whether determinism and free will are compatible. The key to such a defense is a focus on the fact that most actions for which we hold one another responsible are quite ordinary—trespassing traffic regulations, tardiness, or breaking a promise. As we will show, unlike actions that problematize our moral competence — e.g. akratic and ‘moral monster’- like ones—ordinary ‘wrong’ actions often disclose this competence. Hence, no counterfactual assumption is needed to establish that some of us are sometimes responsible for some of the actions we perform.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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