Explaining Perceptual Entitlement
Erkenntnis 76 (2):243-261 (2012)
Abstract
This paper evaluates the prospects of harnessing “anti-individualism” about the contents of perceptual states to give an account of the epistemology of perception, making special reference to Tyler Burge’s ( 2003 ) paper, “Perceptual Entitlement”. I start by clarifying what kind of warrant is provided by perceptual experience, and I go on to survey different ways one might explain the warrant provided by perceptual experience in terms of anti-individualist views about the individuation of perceptual states. I close by motivating accounts which instead give a more prominent role to consciousness
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2011-07-14
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2011-07-14
Total views
822 ( #5,343 of 58,349 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #20,706 of 58,349 )
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