'If-then' as a version of 'Implies'

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Russell’s role in the controversy about the paradoxes of material implication is usually presented as a tale of how even the greatest minds can fall prey of basic conceptual confusions. Quine accused him of making a silly mistake in Principia Mathematica. He interpreted ‘if-then’ as a version of ‘implies’ and called it material implication. Quine’s accusation is that this decision involved a use-mention fallacy because the antecedent and consequent of ‘if-then’ are used instead of being mentioned as the premise and the conclusion of an implication relation. It was his opinion that the criticisms and alternatives to the material implication presented by C. I. Lewis and others would never be made in the first place if Russell simply called the Philonian construction ‘material conditional’ instead of ‘material implication’. Quine’s interpretation on the topic became hugely influential, if not universally accepted. This paper will present the following criticisms against this interpretation: (1) the notion of material implication does not involve a use-mention fallacy, since the components of ‘if-then’ are mentioned and not used; (2) Quine’s belief that the components of ‘if-then’ are used was motivated by a conditional-assertion view of conditionals that is widely controversial and faces numerous difficulties; (3) the Philonian construction remains paradoxical even if it is called ‘material conditional’; (4) the Philonian construction is more plausible when it is interpreted as a material implication.
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First archival date: 2020-01-30
Latest version: 12 (2020-12-06)
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