Paraconsistent Logic as Model Building

South American Journal of Logic 1 (4):195-217 (2018)
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Abstract
The terms “model” and “model-building” have been used to characterize the field of formal philosophy, to evaluate philosophy’s and philosophical logic’s progress and to define philosophical logic itself. A model is an idealization, in the sense of being a deliberate simplification of something relatively complex in which several important aspects are left aside, but also in the sense of being a view too perfect or excellent, not found in reality, of this thing. Paraconsistent logic is a branch of philosophical logic. It is however not clear how paraconsistent logic can be seen as model-building. What exactly is modeled? In this paper I adopt the perspective of looking at a particular instance of paraconsistent logic—paranormal modal logic—which might be seen as a model of a specific kind of agent: inductive agents. After ntroducing what I call the highlevel and low-level models of inductive agents, I analyze the extent to which the above-mentioned idealizing features of model-building appear in paranormal modal logic and how they affect its philosophical significance.
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