The significance of high-level content

Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper is an essay in counterfactual epistemology. What if experience have high-level contents, to the effect that something is a lemon or that someone is sad? I survey the consequences for epistemology of such a scenario, and conclude that many of the striking consequences could be reached even if our experiences don't have high-level contents.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP

1,054 (#5,668)

6 months
37 (#22,963)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?