Change blindness, representations, and consciousness: Reply to Noe

Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):219 (2005)
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Abstract

Our recent opinion article [1] examined what change blindness can and cannot tell us about visual representations. Among other things, we argued that change blindness can tell us a lot about how visual representations can be used, but little about their extent. We and others found the ‘sparse representations’ view appealing (and still do), and initially made the overly strong claim that change blindness supports the conclusion of sparse representations [2,3]. We wrote our article because change blindness continues to be taken as evidence for sparse – or even absent – representations, and we used O’Regan and Noë’s influential paper [4] as an example. However, as has been noted for some time [5–8], this conclusion is logically flawed: lack of ability need not be caused by lack of representation.

Author Profiles

Ronald A. Rensink
University of British Columbia
Daniel Simons
University of Manchester

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