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  1. Blindness, Short-Sightedness, and Hirschberg’s Contextually Ordered Alternatives: A Reply to Schlenker (2012).Giorgio Magri - forthcoming - In Linguistic and Psycholinguistic Approaches on Implicatures and Presuppositions. Palgrave.
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  2. Mapping the Visual Icon.Sam Clarke - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):552-577.
    It is often claimed that pre-attentive vision has an ‘iconic’ format. This is seen to explain pre-attentive vision's characteristically high processing capacity and to make sense of an overlap in the mechanisms of early vision and mental imagery. But what does the iconicity of pre-attentive vision amount to? This paper considers two prominent ways of characterising pre-attentive visual icons and argues that neither is adequate: one approach renders the claim ‘pre-attentive vision is iconic’ empirically false while the other obscures its (...)
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  3. Contents of Unconscious Color Perception.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):665-681.
    In the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue for a (...)
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  4. To Have Seen or Not to Have Seen: A Look at Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark (1997).Ronald A. Rensink - 2018 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 13 (2):230– 235.
    Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark (1997) drew attention to the phenomenon of change blindness, in which even large changes can be difficult to notice if made during the appearance of motion transients elsewhere in the image. This article provides a sketch of the events that inspired that article as well as its subsequent impact on psychological science and on society at large.
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  5. Attention, Fixation, and Change Blindness.Tony Cheng - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):19-26.
    The topic of this paper is the complex interaction between attention, fixation, and one species of change blindness. The two main interpretations of the target phenomenon are the ‘blindness’ interpretation and the ‘inaccessibility’ interpretation. These correspond to the sparse view (Dennett 1991; Tye, 2007) and the rich view (Dretske 2007; Block, 2007a, 2007b) of visual consciousness respectively. Here I focus on the debate between Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Section 1 describes the target phenomenon and the dialectics it entails. Section (...)
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  6. Does Phenomenal Consciousness Overflow Attention? An Argument From Feature-Integration.Joshua Myers - 2017 - Florida Philosophical Review 17 (1):28-44.
    In the past two decades a number of arguments have been given in favor of the possibility of phenomenal consciousness without attentional access, otherwise known as phenomenal overflow. This paper will show that the empirical data commonly cited in support of this thesis is, at best, ambiguous between two equally plausible interpretations, one of which does not posit phenomenology beyond attention. Next, after citing evidence for the feature-integration theory of attention, this paper will give an account of the relationship between (...)
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  7. Type 2 Blindsight and the Nature of Visual Experience.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:92-103.
    Blindsight is a kind of residual vision found in people with lesions to V1. Subjects with blindsight typically report no visual awareness, but they are nonetheless able to make above-chance guesses about the shape, location, color and movement of visual stimuli presented to them in their blind field. A different kind of blindsight, sometimes called type 2 blindsight, is a kind of residual vision found in patients with V1 lesions in the presence of some residual awareness. Type 2 blindsight differs (...)
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  8. The History of Vision.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (3):259-271.
    One of the most influential ideas of twentieth-century art history and aesthetics is that vision has a history and it is the task of art history to trace how vision has changed. This claim has recently been attacked for both empirical and conceptual reasons. My aim is to argue for a new version of the history of vision claim: if visual attention has a history, then vision also has a history. And we have some reason to think that at least (...)
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  9. A Function-Centered Taxonomy of Visual Attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 347-375.
    It is suggested that the relationship between visual attention and conscious visual experience can be simplified by distinguishing different aspects of both visual attention and visual experience. A set of principles is first proposed for any possible taxonomy of the processes involved in visual attention. A particular taxonomy is then put forward that describes five such processes, each with a distinct function and characteristic mode of operation. Based on these, three separate kinds—or possibly grades—of conscious visual experience can be distinguished, (...)
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  10. Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Edited by Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies, and Wayne Wu.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):623-628.
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  11. Consciousness, Attention, and Justification.Nicholas Silins & Susanna Siegel - 2014 - In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.
    We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
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  12. Perception and Attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2013 - In Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology. pp. 97-116.
    Our visual experience of the world is one of diverse objects and events, each with particular colors, shapes, and motions. This experience is so coherent, so immediate, and so effortless that it seems to result from a single system that lets us experience everything in our field of view. But however appealing, this belief is mistaken: there are severe limits on what can be visually experienced. -/- For example, in a display for air-traffic control it is important to track all (...)
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  13. Identity-Crowding and Object-Seeing: A Reply to Block.Bradley Richards - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):9-19.
    Contrary to Block's assertion, “identity-crowding” does not provide an interesting instance of object-seeing without object-attention. The successful judgments and unusual phenomenology of identity-crowding are better explained by unconscious perception and non-perceptual phenomenology associated with cognitive states. In identity-crowding, as in other cases of crowding, subjects see jumbled textures and cannot individuate the items contributing to those textures in the absence of attention. Block presents an attenuated sense in which identity-crowded items are seen, but this is irrelevant to the debate about (...)
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  14. Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
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  15. Exploring the Informational Sources of Metaperception: The Case of Change Blindness Blindness.Anna Loussouarn, Damien Gabriel & Joëlle Proust - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1489-1501.
    Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” . They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and (...)
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  16. The Management of Visual Attention in Graphic Displays.Ronald A. Rensink - 2011 - In Human Attention in Digital Environments. Cambridge University Press. pp. 63-92.
    This chapter presents an overview of several recent developments in vision science, and outlines some of their implications for the management of visual attention in graphic displays. These include ways of sending attention to the right item at the right time, techniques to improve attentional efficiency, and possibilities for offloading some of the processing typically done by attention onto nonattentional mechanisms. In addition it is argued that such techniques not only allow more effective use to be made of visual attention, (...)
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  17. Review of Sleights of Mind: What the Neuroscience of Magic Reveals About Our Brains[REVIEW]Neil Van Leeuwen - 2011 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 16 (5):473-478.
    The book I review, _Sleights of Mind_, aims to illuminate properties of perceptual systems by discussing human susceptibility to magical illusions. I describe how the authors use psychological principles to explain two tricks, spoon bending and the Miser's Dream. I also argue that the book is congenial to the following view of illusions: susceptibility to illusion is the result of evolutionary trade-offs; perceptual systems must make assumptions in order to function at all, but susceptibility to illusion is the byproduct of (...)
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  18. Attention and Perceptual Content.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):263-270.
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
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  19. Seeing Seeing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2010 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):68-78.
    This paper discusses several key issues concerning consciousness and human vision. A brief overview is presented of recent developments in this area, including issues that have been resolved and issues that remain unsettled. Based on this, three Hilbert questions are proposed. These involve three related sets of issues: the kinds of visual experience that exist, the kinds of visual attention that exist, and the ways that these relate to each other.
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  20. Change Blindness and Inattentional Blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2009 - In William Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness, vol 1. New York: Elsevier. pp. 47-59.
    As observers, we generally have a strong impression of seeing everything in front of us at any moment. But compelling as it is, this impression is false – there are severe limits to what we can consciously experience in everyday life. Much of the evidence for this claim has come from two phenomena: change blindness (CB) and inattentional blindness (IB). -/- CB refers to the failure of an observer to visually experience changes that are easily seen once noticed. This can (...)
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  21. On the Applications of Change Blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2008 - Psychologia 51:100-106.
    An overview is presented of the ways that change blindness has been applied to the study of various issues in perception and cognition. Topics include mechanisms of change perception, allocation of attention, nonconscious perception, and cognitive beliefs. Recent work using change blindness to investigate these topics is surveyed, along with a brief discussion of some of the ways that these approaches may further develop over the next few years.
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  22. Change Blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press. pp. 76--81.
    Large changes that occur in clear view of an observer can become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, blink, or other such disturbance. This change blindness is consistent with the proposal that focused visual attention is necessary to see change, with a change becoming difficult to notice whenever conditions prevent attention from being automatically drawn to it. -/- It is shown here how the phenomenon of change blindness can provide new results on the nature of visual attention, (...)
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  23. Change Blindness: Past, Present, and Future.Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):16-20.
    Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set of requirements (...)
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  24. Change Blindness, Representations, and Consciousness: Reply to Noe.Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):219.
    Our recent opinion article [1] examined what change blindness can and cannot tell us about visual representations. Among other things, we argued that change blindness can tell us a lot about how visual representations can be used, but little about their extent. We and others found the ‘sparse representations’ view appealing (and still do), and initially made the overly strong claim that change blindness supports the conclusion of sparse representations [2,3]. We wrote our article because change blindness continues to be (...)
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  25. Obscuring Length Changes During Animated Motion.Jason Harrison, Ronald A. Rensink & Michiel van de Panne - 2004 - ACM Transactions on Graphics 23:569-573.
    In this paper we examine to what extent the lengths of the links in an animated articulated figure can be changed without the viewer being aware of the change. This is investigated in terms of a framework that emphasizes the role of attention in visual perception. We conducted a set of five experiments to establish bounds for the sen-sitivity to changes in length as a function of several parameters and the amount of attention available. We found that while length changes (...)
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  26. Visual Sensing Without Seeing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2004 - Psychological Science 15:27-32.
    It has often been assumed that when we use vision to become aware of an object or event in our surroundings, this must be accompanied by a corresponding visual experience (i.e., seeing). The studies reported here show that this assumption is incorrect. When observers view a sequence of displays alternating between an image of a scene and the same image changed in some way, they often feel (or sense) the change even though they have no visual experience of it. The (...)
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  27. Changes.Ronald A. Rensink - 2002 - Progress in Brain Research 140:199-209.
    This past decade has seen a great resurgence of interest in the perception of change. Change has, of course, long been recognized as a phenomenon worthy of study, and vision scientists have given their attention to it at various times in the past (for a review, see Rensink, 2002a). But things seem different this time around. This time, there is an emerging belief that instead of being just another visual ability, the perception of change may be something central to our (...)
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  28. Change Detection.Ronald A. Rensink - 2002 - Annual Review of Psychology 53 (1):245-277.
    Five aspects of visual change detection are reviewed. The first concerns the concept of change itself, in particular the ways it differs from the related notions of motion and difference. The second involves the various methodological approaches that have been developed to study change detection; it is shown that under a variety of conditions observers are often unable to see large changes directly in their field of view. Next, it is argued that this “change blindness” indicates that focused attention is (...)
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  29. Change Blindness: Implications for the Nature of Visual Attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2001 - In L. Harris & M. Jenkin (eds.), Vision and Attention. New York: Academic Press. pp. 16-20.
    In the not-too-distant past, vision was often said to involve three levels of processing: a low level concerned with descriptions of the geometric and photometric properties of the image, a high level concerned with abstract knowledge of the physical and semantic properties of the world, and a middle level concerned with anything not handled by the other two. The negative definition of mid-level vision contained in this description reflected a rather large gap in our understanding of visual processing: How could (...)
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  30. Review of Don Dedrick, Naming the Rainbow: Colour Language, Colour Science, and Culture. [REVIEW]John Sutton - 2001 - Philosophy in Review/ Comptes Rendus Philosophiques:106-109.
    By spotlighting the irreducible role of cognitive processes between biology and culture, this synthesis and critique of the universalist tradition in colour science offers a genuine starting-point for all future 'serious inquiry into the relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of colour classification'.
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  31. Picture Changes During Blinks: Looking Without Seeing and Seeing Without Looking.J. Kevin O'Regan, H. Deubel, James J. Clark & Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7:191-211.
    Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized. -/- The results obtained were very similar to those obtained in (...)
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  32. When Good Observers Go Bad: Change Blindness, Inattentional Blindness, and Visual Experience.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6 (9).
    Several studies (e.g., Becklen & Cervone, 1983; Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser & Becklen, 1975) have found that observers attending to a particular object or event often fail to report the presence of unexpected items. This has been interpreted as inattentional blindness (IB), a failure to see unattended items (Mack & Rock, 1998). Meanwhile, other studies (e.g., Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons, 1996) have found that observers often fail to report the presence of large changes in (...)
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  33. The Dynamic Representation of Scenes.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7 (1/2/3):17-42.
    One of the more powerful impressions created by vision is that of a coherent, richly-detailed world where everything is present simultaneously. Indeed, this impression is so compelling that we tend to ascribe these properties not only to the external world, but to our internal representations as well. But results from several recent experiments argue against this latter ascription. For example, changes in images of real-world scenes often go unnoticed when made during a saccade, flicker, blink, or movie cut. This "change (...)
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  34. Scene Perception.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - In A. E. Kazdin (ed.), Encyclopedia of Psychology. Oxford University Press. pp. 151-155.
    Scene Perception is the visual perception of an environment as viewed by an observer at any given time. It includes not only the perception of individual objects, but also such things as their relative locations, and expectations about what other kinds of objects might be encountered. -/- Given that scene perception is so effortless for most observers, it might be thought of as something easy to understand. However, the amount of effort required by a process often bears little relation to (...)
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  35. Visual Search for Change: A Probe Into the Nature of Attentional Processing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7:345-376.
    A set of visual search experiments tested the proposal that focused attention is needed to detect change. Displays were arrays of rectangles, with the target being the item that continually changed its orientation or contrast polarity. Five aspects of performance were examined: linearity of response, processing time, capacity, selectivity, and memory trace. Detection of change was found to be a self-terminating process requiring a time that increased linearly with the number of items in the display. Capacity for orientation was found (...)
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  36. Seeing, Sensing, and Scrutinizing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Vision Research 40:1469-1487.
    Large changes in a scene often become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, image flicker, movie cut, or other such disturbance. It is argued here that this _change blindness_ can serve as a useful tool to explore various aspects of vision. This argument centers around the proposal that focused attention is needed for the explicit perception of change. Given this, the study of change perception can provide a useful way to determine the nature of visual attention, and (...)
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  37. On the Failure to Detect Changes in Scenes Across Brief Interruptions.Ronald A. Rensink, Kevin J. O'Regan & James J. Clark - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7 (1/2/3):127-145.
    When brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: the changes become extremely difficult to notice, even when they are large, presented repeatedly, and the observer expects them to occur (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). To determine the mechanisms behind this induced "change blindness", four experiments examine its dependence on initial preview and on the nature of the interruptions used. Results support the proposal that representations at (...)
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  38. To See or Not to See: The Need for Attention to Perceive Changes in Scenes.Ronald A. Rensink, J. Kevin O'Regan & James J. Clark - 1997 - Psychological Science 8:368-373.
    When looking at a scene, observers feel that they see its entire structure in great detail and can immediately notice any changes in it. However, when brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: identification of changes becomes extremely difficult, even when changes are large and made repeatedly. Identification is much faster when a verbal cue is provided, showing that poor visibility is not the cause of (...)
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  39. Nontransitivity, Indiscriminability, and Looking the Same.Diana Raffman - manuscript
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  40. On Schellenberg’s The Unity of Perception.Ayoob Shahmoradi - manuscript
    My general worry is that Schellenberg’s arguments against naive realism, generalism, and Russellian representationalism do not seem to be successful. Thus her attempt at ruling these views out fails. Her main arguments rely on a shared premise whose plausibility, in the absence of an appropriate theory of particulars, is hard to assess (§2.1). Apart from that, these arguments rely on an under-specified notion of constitution; there seems to be no sense of the term that makes all the premises of her (...)
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