Expressivism and the practicality of moral convictions

Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2-4):201-220 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many expressivists have employed a claim about the practicality of morality in support of their view that moral convictions are not purely descriptive mental states. In this paper I argue that all extant arguments of this form fail. I distinguish several versions of such arguments and argue that in each case either the sense of practicality the argument employs is too weak, in which case there is no reason to think that descriptive states cannot be practical or the sense of practicality the argument employs is too strong, in which case there is no reason to think moral convictions are practical. I also discuss and dismiss an attempted patch of such arguments provided by Humean Psychology. The conclusion is that expressivists need to look to sources other than the alleged practicality of morality to support their position. In concluding remarks I suggest one such alternative.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SINEAT-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
Conceptual Role Semantics and the Reference of Moral Concepts.Neil Sinclair - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy (1):95-121.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
200 ( #10,864 of 33,720 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #19,563 of 33,720 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.