Neutrality and Force in Field's Epistemological Objection to Platonism

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Field’s challenge to platonists is the challenge to explain the reliable match between mathematical truth and belief. The challenge grounds an objection claiming that platonists cannot provide such an explanation. This objection is often taken to be both neutral with respect to controversial epistemological assumptions, and a comparatively forceful objection against platonists. I argue that these two characteristics are in tension: no construal of the objection in the current literature realises both, and there are strong reasons to think that no version of Field’s epistemological objection which has both Neutrality and Force can be construed.

Author's Profile

Ylwa Sjölin Wirling
University of Gothenburg

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