What is Field's Epistemological Objection to Platonism?

In Robin Stenwall & Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (eds.), Maurinian Truths. pp. 123-133 (2019)
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This paper concerns an epistemological objection against mathematical platonism, due to Hartry Field.The argument poses an explanatory challenge – the challenge to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs – which the platonist, it’s argued, cannot meet. Is the objection compelling? Philosophers disagree, but they also disagree on (and are sometimes very unclear about) how the objection should be understood. Here I distinguish some options, and highlight some gaps that need to be filled in on the potentially most compelling version of the argument.
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Truth and Truthmakers.Armstrong, D. M.

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