When Conciliation Frustrates the Epistemic Priorities of Groups
In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge (2021)
Abstract
Our aim in this chapter is to draw attention to what we see as a disturbing feature of conciliationist views of disagreement. Roughly put, the trouble is that conciliatory responses to in-group disagreement can lead to the frustration of a group's epistemic priorities: that is, the group's favoured trade-off between the "Jamesian goals" of truth-seeking and error-avoidance. We show how this problem can arise within a simple belief aggregation framework, and draw some general lessons about when the problem is most pronounced. We close with a tentative proposal for how to solve the problem raised without rejecting conciliationism.
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SKIWCF
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-03-04
View other versions
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-03-04
Total views
137 ( #33,072 of 56,892 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
70 ( #9,949 of 56,892 )
2020-03-04
Total views
137 ( #33,072 of 56,892 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
70 ( #9,949 of 56,892 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.