Is it ever rational to hold inconsistent beliefs?

Philosophical Studies:1-17 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this paper I investigate whether there are any cases in which it is rational for a person to hold inconsistent beliefs and, if there are, just what implications this might have for the theory of epistemic justification. A number of issues will crop up along the way – including the relation between justification and rationality, the nature of defeat, the possibility of epistemic dilemmas, the importance of positive epistemic duties, and the distinction between transitional and terminal attitudes.

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Martin Smith
University of Edinburgh

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