L’ontologie de la realité sociale

In P. Livet & R. Ogien (eds.), L’Enquête ontologique, du mode de l'existence des objets sociaux. Paris: Editions EHESS. pp. 185--208 (2000)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Part 1 of this exchange consists in a critique by Smith of Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality focusing on Searle’s use of the formula ‘X counts as Y in context C’. Smith argues that this formula works well for social objects such as dollar bills and presidents where the corresponding X terms (pieces of paper, human beings) are easy to identify. In cases such as debts and prices and money in a banks computers, however, the formula fails, because these are cases of what he calls ‘free-standing Y terms’, since there is here no X which can count as the corresponding Y. In his response in Part 2, Searle argues that Smith’s critique rests on three misunderstandings: 1. in wrongly presupposing that Searle is trying to analyze the nature of what he calls “social objects”, rather than of social facts; 2. in thinking that the counts as formula is intended as a definition, rather than as a mere mnemonic; and 3. in neglecting the naturalism of Searle’s account.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SMILDL
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-08-06
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-07-03

Total views
84 ( #39,435 of 54,477 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #41,213 of 54,477 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.