On the Cognition of States of Affairs

In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff. pp. 189-225 (1987)
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Abstract
The theory of speech acts put forward by Adolf Reinach in his "The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law" of 1913 rests on a systematic account of the ontological structures associated with various different sorts of language use. One of the most original features of Reinach's account lies in hIs demonstration of how the ontological structure of, say, an action of promising or of commanding, may be modified in different ways, yielding different sorts of non-standard instances of the corresponding speech act varieties. The present paper is an attempt to apply this idea of standard and modified instances of ontological structures to the realm of judgement and cognition, and thereby to develop a Reinachian theory of how intentionality is mediated through language in acts of thinking and speaking.
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References found in this work BETA
Truth­-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 2009 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
Truth-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):287-321.
An Essay in Formal Ontology.Barry Smith - 1978 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 6:39-62.

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Citations of this work BETA
Fiat Objects.Barry Smith - 2001 - Topoi 20 (2):131-148.
Lógica y ontología formal.Barry Smith - 2004 - In Grupo de Acción Filosófica (GAF). Buenos Aires, Argentina,: Grupo de Acción Filosófica (Gaf), Buenos Aires.
On Drawing Lines on a Map.Barry Smith - 1995 - In A. U. Frank, W. Kuhn & D. M. Mark (eds.), Spatial Information Theory: Proceedings of COSIT '95. New York: Springer. pp. 475-484.

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