On the Global Ambitions of Phenomenal Conservatism

Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):206-244 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
What is the role of phenomenal consciousness in grounding epistemic justification? This paper explores the prospects for a global version of phenomenal conservatism inspired by the work of Michael Huemer, according to which all epistemic justification is grounded in phenomenal seemings. I’m interested in this view because of its global ambitions: it seeks to explain all epistemic justification in terms of a single epistemic principle, which says that you have epistemic justification to believe whatever seems to you strongly enough on balance to be true. One of the attractions of phenomenal conservatism is that it offers such a simple and unified framework for explaining the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness. I will argue, however, that the simplicity of phenomenal conservatism is not a theoretical virtue, but a theoretical vice, since it distorts the epistemological phenomena it is supposed to explain. In effect, phenomenal conservatism seeks to explain all epistemic justification on the same model as perception. But this has the predictable effect of distorting the epistemology of other domains, including introspection, inference, and a priori justification.
Reprint years
2019
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SMIOTG-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-05-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-05-21

Total views
201 ( #21,592 of 50,504 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #9,549 of 50,504 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.