Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons

Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242 (2013)
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Abstract
Contrastivism about reasons is the view that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. This is in opposition to a more traditional theory on which reasons are reasons for things simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides a solution to a puzzle involving reason claims that explicitly employ ‘rather than’. Contrastivism solves the puzzle by allowing that some fact might be a reason for an action out of one set of alternatives without being a reason for that action out of a different set of alternatives
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Moral Reasons.Dancy, Jonathan

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Contextualism About Epistemic Reasons.Fogal, Daniel & Sylvan, Kurt
Promotion as Contrastive Increase in Expected Fit.Sharadin, Nathaniel & Dellsén, Finnur

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