Überlegungen zur Vielfalt der "Nichts-Rede"

Prima Philosophia 10 (3):341–257 (1997)
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The variety and ambiguity of our use of negation has often been classified according to the classes of negated terms. But if we take into account, first, the negations of possibility and necessity, and second, the negations of questions and wishes, it seems that not only negated expressions change, but the way to negate as well. If we consider that up to here every negation has only been a relative one, we may ask if it is possible to say „nothing“ or „not“ in an absolute manner. This attempt is not idle, since great principles, such as that of sufficient reason , possibly make use of an absolute „not.“ How to speak of an "absolute nothing"? - Our negative speech is not exhausted by negation, since opposition, contradiction and difference contain some idea of the negative too. Certain remarks in Plato’s Sophist point to a prerogative position of difference within the whole group of negative speech mentioned above

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