Consciousness, introspection, and subjective measures
In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Abstract
This chapter discusses the main types of so-called ’subjective measures of consciousness’ used in current-day science of consciousness. After explaining the key worry about such measures, namely the problem of an ever-present response bias, I discuss the question of whether subjective measures of consciousness are introspective. I show that there is no clear answer to this question, as proponents of subjective measures do not employ a worked-out notion of subjective access. In turn, this makes the problem of response bias less tractable than it might otherwise be.Author's Profile
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2018-10-21
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2018-10-21
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544 (#15,878)
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62 (#19,866)
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