Two Mereological Arguments Against the Possibility of an Omniscient Being

Philo 9 (1):62-72 (2006)
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Abstract
In this paper I present two new arguments against the possibility of an omniscient being. My new arguments invoke considerations of cardinality and resemble several arguments originally presented by Patrick Grim. Like Grim, I give reasons to believe that there must be more objects in the universe than there are beliefs. However, my arguments will rely on certain mereological claims, namely that Classical Extensional Mereology is necessarily true of the part-whole relation. My first argument is an instance of a problem first noted by Gideon Rosen and requires an additional assumption about the mereological structure of certain beliefs. That assumption is that an omniscient being’s beliefs are mereological simples. However, this assumption is dropped when I present my second argument. Thus, I hope to show that if Classical Extensional Mereology is true of the part-whole relation, there cannot be an omniscient being
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References found in this work BETA
Mereology.Varzi, Achille C.
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.
Parts of Classes.LEWIS, David

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Citations of this work BETA
Problems with Plurals.Rasmussen, Joshua & Pruss, Alexander R.

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