Results for 'Omniscience'

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  1. Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that (...)
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  2. Truth, Omniscience, and Cantorian Arguments: An Exchange.Alvin Plantinga & Patrick Grim - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (3):267-306.
    An exchange between Patrick Grim and Alvin Plantinga regarding Cantorian arguments against the possibility of an omniscient being.
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  3. (1 other version)Omniscience, Freedom, and Mystery.Damiano Migliorini - 2018 - Nuovo Giornale di Filosofia Della Religione 8 (2).
    The text published below is the translation of a part of this published article: "Il Dio che rischia e che cambia: introduzione all’Open Theism". The issue of omniscience is one of the most debated in contemporary Analytical Philosophy of Religion. However, what is often lacking in this discussion is a deep understanding of the dilemma of omniscience and human freedom within a complete epistemological (what can we really say about the divine and the world), metaphysical and theological framework. (...)
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  4. Freedom, Omniscience and the Contingent A Priori.Fabio Lampert - forthcoming - Mind.
    One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism—roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be skeptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be (...)
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  5. Logical Omniscience and Acknowledged vs. Consequential Commitments.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Questions, Discourse and Dialogue: 20 Years After Making It Explicit, Proceedings of AISB50.
    The purpose of this paper is to consider the explanatory resources that Robert Brandom‟s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. 12.
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  6. Fragmentation and logical omniscience.Adam Elga & Agustín Rayo - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):716-741.
    It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality — standards that do not require logical omniscience (Garber 1983, Hacking 1967). To that end we develop a “fragmented” decision theory in which a single state of mind is represented by a family of credence functions, each associated with a distinct choice condition (Lewis 1982, Stalnaker 1984). The theory imposes a local coherence assumption guaranteeing that as an (...)
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  7. Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: an impossibility result.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.
    In this paper, I investigate whether we can use a world-involving framework to model the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. The standard possible-world framework falters in this respect because of a commitment to logical omniscience. A familiar attempt to overcome this problem centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in modal space, it is easy to model extremely non-ideal agents (...)
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  8. Against omniscience: The case from essential indexicals.Patrick Grim - 1985 - Noûs 19 (2):151-180.
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  9. The omniscient speaker puzzle.Aleksander Domosławski - 2024 - Synthese 203 (65):1-16.
    The epistemicist theory aims to explain ignorance due to vagueness by semantic plasticity: the shiftiness of intensions across close possible worlds resulting from shiftiness in usage. This explanation is challenged by the Omniscient Speaker Puzzle (Sennet in Philos Stud 161(2):273–285, 2012). Suppose that an omniscient speaker, Barney, who knows all the facts about usage and how these facts determine the intensions of expressions, cooks up a scheme to stabilise the intension of a normally semantically plastic term like ‘rich’. It seems (...)
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  10. Truth, omniscience, and the knower.Patrick Grim - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (1):9 - 41.
    Let us sum up. The paradox of the Knower poses a direct and formal challenge to the coherence of common notions of knowledge and truth. We've considered a number of ways one might try to meet that challenge: propositional views of truth and knowledge, redundancy or operator views, and appeal to hierarchy of various sorts. Mere appeal to propositions or operators, however, seems to be inadequate to the task of the Knower, at least if unsupplemented by an auxiliary recourse to (...)
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  11. The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):917-939.
    The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom’s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in particular (...)
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  12. (1 other version)Divine omniscience and voluntary action.Nelson Pike - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):27-46.
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  13. Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience.Patrick Grim - 1983 - American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (3):265-277.
    One set of neglected problems consists of paradoxes of omniscience clearly recognizable as forms of the Liar, and these I have never seen raised at all. Other neglected problems are difficulties for omniscience posed by recent work on belief de se and essential indexicals. These have not yet been given the attention they deserve.
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  14. Problems for Omniscience.Patrick Grim - 2013 - In J. P. Moreland, K. A. Sweis & Ch V. Meister (eds.), Debating Christian Theism. Oxford Univ. Press. pp. 169-180.
    A survey of logical problems for the concept of omniscience.
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  15. On Omniscience and a 'Set of All Truths': A Reply to Bringsjord.Patrick Grim - 1990 - Analysis 50 (4):271 - 276.
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  16. Divine omniscience and the fatalist dilemma.David Kyle Johnson - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (4):435–54.
    Arguments against our free will pose a serious problem. Although there are not very many philosophers who call themselves fatalists, quite a few are convinced that fatalism follows from common assumptions. Assuming that most believe themselves to be free, identifying ways to avoid the conclusion of such fatalist arguments is quite an important task. I begin by dealing specifically with theological fatalism. I present many versions of theological fatalism, but come to the conclusion that only one version constitutes a genuine (...)
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  17. Omniscience, the Incarnation, and Knowledge de se.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):59--71.
    A knowledge argument is offered that presents unique difficulties for Christians who wish to assert that God is essentially omniscient. The difficulties arise from the doctrine of the incarnation. Assuming that God the Son did not necessarily have to become incarnate, then God cannot necessarily have knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind. If this is right, then God’s epistemic powers are not fixed across possible worlds and God is not essentially omniscient. Some options for Christian theists (...)
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  18. A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):501-521.
    The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, violate the (...)
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  19. Dispositional omniscience.David Hunt - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (3):243 - 278.
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  20. Arguments for Omniscient Fatalism.Benjamin Arturo Villalobos - manuscript
    A series of proofs for omniscient fatalism. (needs work).
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  21. Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2019 - Noûs 55 (1):102-127.
    At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true (...)
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  22. Omniscience and the problem of evil.Peter Hutcheson - 1992 - Sophia 31 (1-2):53-58.
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  23. On logical omniscience.Jacques Dubucs - 1991 - Logique Et Analyse 133 (133-140):41-55.
    Standard epistemic logic actually formalizes folk-psychology. The problem of logical omniscience shows that this logic is not adequate in a cognitivist setting. In order to describe realistic information-processing believers, we need both an ontology of particulars and a hyper-intensional taxonomy of representations. From this point of view, sub-structural logics, which do not overlook the syntaxic details of the processing of information, are an interesting alternative to possible worlds semantics.
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  24. Factive knowability and the problem of possible omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.
    Famously, the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability is a deductive argument from the thesis that all truths are knowable to the conclusion that all truths are known. In this argument, knowability is analyzed in terms of having the possibility to know. Several philosophers have objected to this analysis, because it turns knowability into a nonfactive notion. In addition, they claim that, if the knowability thesis is reformulated with the help of factive concepts of knowability, then omniscience can be avoided. In (...)
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  25. Random drift and the omniscient viewpoint.Roberta L. Millstein - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S10-S18.
    Alexander Rosenberg (1994) claims that the omniscient viewpoint of the evolutionary process would have no need for the concept of random drift. However, his argument fails to take into account all of the processes which are considered to be instances of random drift. A consideration of these processes shows that random drift is not eliminable even given a position of omniscience. Furthermore, Rosenberg must take these processes into account in order to support his claims that evolution is deterministic and (...)
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  26. L'accointance entre omniscience et omnipotence.Matthias Michel - forthcoming - Klesis.
    Introspection is the capacity by which we know our own conscious mental states. Several theories aim to explain it. According to acquaintance theory, we know our experiences by being acquainted with them. Acquaintance is non-causal, non-inferential, and non-observational. I present a dilemma for the acquaintance theory of introspection. Either subjects are always acquainted with all their experiences; or some attentional mechanism selects the relevant experiences (or aspects of experiences) for introspection. The first option is implausible: it implies that subjects are (...)
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  27. Skeptical hypotheses and 'omniscient' interpreters.Steven L. Reynolds - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):184 – 195.
    An attempt to defend Davidson's omniscient interpreter argument against various attempts to show that it does not succeed in showing that most of our beliefs must be true. It doesn't argue that this is a good answer to skepticism.
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  28. Openness, Privilege, and Omniscience.Christopher Hughes - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):35--64.
    According to egalitarians, there is no privileged now-possible history. Egalitarianism seems to provide an attractive way to reconcile openness and omniscience, but, I argue, it does not.
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  29. The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.
    We propose a solution to the problem of logical omniscience in what we take to be its fundamental version: as concerning arbitrary agents and the knowledge attitude per se. Our logic of knowledge is a spin-off from a general theory of thick content, whereby the content of a sentence has two components: an intension, taking care of truth conditions; and a topic, taking care of subject matter. We present a list of plausible logical validities and invalidities for the logic (...)
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  30. Ontological omniscience in Lewisian modal realism.J. Reinert - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):676-682.
    A simple argument against Lewisian modal realism as portrayed in On the Plurality of World arises from its treatment of doxastic modalities. It is easily shown that if it is true, it is impossible to doubt the theory on ontological grounds, or, that, if it is possible to maintain doubt about modal realism’s existential postulate, it has to be false. The argument hinges on the fact that modal realism’s main ontological hypothesis, if true, is necessarily true.
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  31. The Compatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action: A Reply to Tomis Kapitan.David P. Hunt - 1996 - Religious Studies 32 (1):49 - 60.
    The paper that follows continues a discussion with Tomis Kapitan in the pages of this journal over the compatibility of divine agency with divine foreknowledge. I had earlier argued against two premises in Kapitan's case for omniscient impotence: (i) that intentionally A-ing presupposes prior acquisition of the intention to A, and (ii) that acquiring the intention to A presupposes prior ignorance whether one will A. In response to my criticisms, Kapitan has recently offered new defences for these two premises. I (...)
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  32. Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen - 2015 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 24 (3):377-399.
    Epistemic logics based on the possible worlds semantics suffer from the problem of logical omniscience, whereby agents are described as knowing all logical consequences of what they know, including all tautologies. This problem is doubly challenging: on the one hand, agents should be treated as logically non-omniscient, and on the other hand, as moderately logically competent. Many responses to logical omniscience fail to meet this double challenge because the concepts of knowledge and reasoning are not properly separated. In (...)
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  33. Fragmentation, metalinguistic ignorance, and logical omniscience.Jens Christian Bjerring & Weng Hong Tang - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2129-2151.
    To reconcile the standard possible worlds model of knowledge with the intuition that ordinary agents fall far short of logical omniscience, a Stalnakerian strategy appeals to two components. The first is the idea that mathematical and logical knowledge is at bottom metalinguistic knowledge. The second is the idea that non-ideal minds are often fragmented. In this paper, we investigate this Stalnakerian reconciliation strategy and argue, ultimately, that it fails. We are not the first to complain about the Stalnakerian strategy. (...)
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  34. Belief, Knowledge, and Omniscience. Review of: Paul Weingartner: Omniscience.Daniel von Wachter - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):267--279.
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  35. Kaikkitietävä ajaton Jumala: Aikaindeksikaalien ongelma (in Finnish) ["Omniscient Timeless God: The Problem of Temporal Indexicals"].Ari Maunu - 2016 - Teologinen Aikakauskirja 2016 (2):121-127.
    Is God a timeless God? One standard argument against the supposition that He is is that it appears to be incompatible with God’s posited omniscience. If God is timeless, He cannot know truths involving temporal indexicals, such as the one I express right now by ”I am sitting now”. In this article, I discuss this argument and consider some replies to it. I focus on the denial of the view according to which knowledge expressed with temporally indexical true statements (...)
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  36. Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.
    This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism’s implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it’s okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on the (...)
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  37. A metalinguistic and computational approach to the problem of mathematical omniscience.Zeynep Soysal - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):455-474.
    In this paper, I defend the metalinguistic solution to the problem of mathematical omniscience for the possible-worlds account of propositions by combining it with a computational model of knowledge and belief. The metalinguistic solution states that the objects of belief and ignorance in mathematics are relations between mathematical sentences and what they express. The most pressing problem for the metalinguistic strategy is that it still ascribes too much mathematical knowledge under the standard possible-worlds model of knowledge and belief on (...)
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  38. De se knowledge and the possibility of an omniscient being.Stephan Torre - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (2):191-200.
    In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and (...)
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  39. Two Mereological Arguments Against the Possibility of an Omniscient Being.Joshua T. Spencer - 2006 - Philo 9 (1):62-72.
    In this paper I present two new arguments against the possibility of an omniscient being. My new arguments invoke considerations of cardinality and resemble several arguments originally presented by Patrick Grim. Like Grim, I give reasons to believe that there must be more objects in the universe than there are beliefs. However, my arguments will rely on certain mereological claims, namely that Classical Extensional Mereology is necessarily true of the part-whole relation. My first argument is an instance of a problem (...)
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  40. Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Aptamimamsa (Devāgamastotra) = Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord.Vijay K. Jain - 2016 - Vikalp Printers.
    Aptamimamsa by Ācārya Samantabhadra (2nd century CE) starts with a discussion, in a philosophical-cum-logical manner, on the Jaina concept of omniscience and the attributes of the Omniscient. The Ācārya questions the validity of the attributes that are traditionally associated with a praiseworthy deity and goes on to establish the logic of accepting the Omniscient as the most trustworthy and praiseworthy Supreme Being. Employing the doctrine of conditional predications (syādvāda) – the logical expression of reality in light of the foundational (...)
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  41. Co o przyszłości Petera Van Inwagena wiedzą Istota Wszechwiedząca i on sam? Krytyka argumentu za sprzecznością przedwiedzy Boga i ludzkiego wolnego działania / What do Peter Van Inwagen and the omniscient being know about Peter Van Inwagen's future? Criticism of the argument for the contradiction of God's foreknowledge and human free action,.Marek Pepliński - 2019 - Przegląd Religioznawczy 272 (2):87-101.
    The article analyzes and criticizes the assumptions of Peter Van Inwagen’s argument for the alleged contradiction of the foreknowledge of God and human freedom. The argument is based on the sine qua non condition of human freedom defined as access to possible worlds containing such a continuation of the present in which the agent implements a different action than will be realized de facto in the future. The condition also contains that in every possible continuation of the present state of (...)
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  42. Computational complexity in the philosophy of mind: unconventional methods to solve the problem of logical omniscience.Safal Aryal - manuscript
    The philosophy of mind is traditionally concerned with the study of mental processes, language, the representation of knowledge and the relation of the mind shares with the body; computational complexity theory is related to the classification of computationally solvable problems (be it via execution time, storage requirements, etc...). While there are well-established links between computer science in general & the philosophy of mind, many possible solutions to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind have not yet been analyzed from the (...)
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  43. Partially Resolving the Tension between Omniscience and Free Will: A Mathematical Argument.Joseph S. Fulda - 1998 - Sorites 9:53-55.
    As the journal is effectively defunct, I am uploading a full-text copy, but only of my abstract and article, and some journal front matter. -/- Note that the pagination in the PDF version differs from the official pagination because A4 and 8.5" x 11" differ. -/- Note also that this is not a mere repetition of the argument in /Mind/, nor merely an application of it; there are subtle differences. -/- Finally, although Christians are likely to take this as applicable (...)
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  44. (2 other versions)Rational Theism, Part One: An A Priori Proof in God's Existence, Omniscient and Omnipotent (A Science of Metaphysics in answer to the challenge of Immanuel Kant).R. Liikanen - 2023 - Bathurst, New Brunswick: Self-published.
    This is a system of pure speculative reason in answer to the challenge issued by Immanuel Kant, in his "Critique of Pure Reason," with regard to metaphysics; the challenge being clearly mentioned in the Appendix to his "Prolegomena..." wherein he asks his Reviewer to take any one of his four sets of contradictory propositions, and offer an a priori judgment/proposition of his own that would overturn the antinomy, and thus, allow room for the possibility of raising metaphysics to the level (...)
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  45. Logical ignorance and logical learning.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9991-10020.
    According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Hacking :311–325, 1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes: an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at any given (...)
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  46. Does God Know What It's Like Not to Know?Rob Lovering - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (1):85-99.
    The topic of divine omniscience is well-trodden ground, with philosophers and theologians having asked virtually every question there is to ask about it. The questions regarding God's omniscience to be addressed here are as follows. First, is omniscience best understood as maximal propositional knowledge along with maximal experiential knowledge? I argue that it is. Second, is it possible for God to be essentially omniscient? I argue that it is not.
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  47. The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking.Anthia Solaki, Francesco Berto & Sonja Smets - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):733-762.
    We present a framework for epistemic logic, modeling the logical aspects of System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes, as per dual process theories of reasoning. The framework combines non-normal worlds semantics with the techniques of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. It models non-logically-omniscient, but moderately rational agents: their System 1 makes fast sense of incoming information by integrating it on the basis of their background knowledge and beliefs. Their System 2 allows them to slowly, step-wise unpack some of the logical consequences (...)
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  48. The being that knew too much.Patrick Grim - 2000 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3):141-154.
    John Abbruzzese has recently attempted a defense of omniscience against a series of my attacks. This affords me a welcome occasion to clarify some of the arguments, to pursue some neglected subtleties, and to re-think some important complications. In the end, however, I must insist that at least three of four crucial arguments really do show an omniscient being to be impossible. Abbruzzese sometimes misunderstands the forms of the argument themselves, and quite generally misunderstands their force.
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  49. L’ockhamismo nel dibattito analitico contemporaneo sull’onniscienza divina. Un bilancio.Damiano Migliorini - 2015 - Laurentianum 56:33-86.
    Over the past three decades, the issue of the relationship between divine omniscience and human freedom has been the subject of great debate. Inside it, were compared many authors and many “solutions”. One of these is the one that is inspired by Ockham’s thought. The author, therefore, aims to present the main theoretical nodes of this solution, following the development that it has had in the various publications about this question. The author also tries to show its limits, to (...)
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  50.  67
    A Note on Eternity.Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio - 2017 - Topoi 36 (4):685-692.
    The timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom has many advantages. Still, the relationship between a timeless God and temporal beings is problematic in a number of ways. In this paper, we focus on the specific problems the timeless view has to deal with when certain assumptions on the metaphysics of time are taken on board. It is shown that on static conception of time God’s omniscience is easily accounted for, but human freedom is threatened, (...)
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