Against Adversarial Discussion

Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1):87-112 (2016)
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Abstract

Why did R.G. Collingwood come to reject the adversarial style of philosophical discussion so popular among his Oxford peers? The main aim of this paper is to explain that Collingwood came to reject his colleagues’ specific style of philosophical dialogue on methodological grounds, and to show how the argument against adversarial philosophical discussion is integrated with Collingwood’s overall criticism of realist philosophy. His argument exploits a connection between method and practice that should be taken seriously even today.

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Maarten Steenhagen
Clemencia Redmond Stichting

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