Moral dimensionality

Abstract

In modern, culturally-heterogeneous societies, inefficiency of communication of important moral concepts is often evidenced by asymmetrical moral judgements and hypocritical behaviour, especially in our increasingly compartmentalised social landscapes [Rozuel 2011]. This raises the question of how to present target audiences with some (perhaps novel) moral concept, like an ethical dimension of one’s ecological attitude, in a way which would resonate with them, and be conducive to a coherent moral stance, decreasing action-observer biases. We analyse this problem by introducing a formal moral inconsistency framework. We consider the ways in which the aforementioned problem might be tackled in existing cognitive science of morality (CSM) nativist frameworks, and, secondly, we investigate it from the perspective of moral learning, finally proposing the notion of moral dimensionality of a representation in the context of model-based reinforcement learning, as a useful conceptual tool for studying the problem.

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2023-11-28

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