Probabilism for stochastic theories

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 66:34–44 (2019)
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Abstract

I defend an analog of probabilism that characterizes rationally coherent estimates for chances. Specifically, I demonstrate the following accuracy-dominance result for stochastic theories in the C*-algebraic framework: supposing an assignment of chance values is possible if and only if it is given by a pure state on a given algebra, your estimates for chances avoid accuracy-dominance if and only if they are given by a state on that algebra. When your estimates avoid accuracy-dominance (roughly: when you cannot guarantee that other estimates would be more accurate), I say that they are sufficiently coherent. In formal epistemology and quantum foundations, the notion of rational coherence that gets more attention requires that you never allow for a sure loss (or “Dutch book”) in a given sort of betting game; I call this notion full coherence. I characterize when these two notions of rational coherence align, and I show that there is a quantum state giving estimates that are sufficiently coherent, but not fully coherent.

Author's Profile

Jer Steeger
University of Bristol

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