Determining the best of all possible worlds

Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1):37-47 (2005)
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Abstract
The concept of the best of all possible worlds is widely considered to be incoherent on the grounds that, for any world that might be termed the best, there is always another that is better. I note that underlying this argument is a conviction that the goodness of a world is determined by a single kind of good, the most plausible candidates for which are not maximizable. Against this I suggest that several goods may have to combine to determine the goodness of a world, and because of logical conflicts between them, the goods can be optimized to give a genuine best of all possible worlds.
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