Determining the best of all possible worlds
Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1):37-47 (2005)
Abstract
The concept of the best of all possible worlds is widely considered to be incoherent on the grounds that, for any world that might be termed the best, there is always another that is better. I note that underlying this argument is a conviction that the goodness of a world is determined by a single kind of good, the most plausible candidates for which are not maximizable. Against this I suggest that several goods may have to combine to determine the goodness of a world, and because of logical conflicts between them, the goods can be optimized to give a genuine best of all possible worlds.
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Archival date: 2017-10-24
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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.Hume, David
Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason.Chang, Ruth (ed.)
Enneads.Plotinus,
Evil and the God of Love.Hick, John
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2009-01-28
Total downloads
51 ( #27,863 of 37,100 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #27,393 of 37,100 )
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