Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?

Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):319-335 (2013)
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Abstract
In the metaethical debate on moral internalism and externalism, appeal is constantly made to people’s intuitions about the connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, internalists and externalists disagree considerably about their content. In this paper, we present an empirical study of laymen’s intuitions about this connection. We found that they lend surprisingly little support to the most celebrated versions of internalism, which provide reasons to be skeptical of the evidential basis for these views.
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2013
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STRIMI
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael

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Citations of this work BETA
Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data.Adleberg, Toni; Thompson, Morgan & Nahmias, Eddy
Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions.Björnsson, Gunnar; Eriksson, John; Strandberg, Caj; Olinder, Ragnar Francén & Björklund, Fredrik
Pushing the Intuitions Behind Moral Internalism.Leben, Derek & Wilckens, Kristine

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2011-11-30

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