Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?

Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):319-335 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In the metaethical debate on moral internalism and externalism, appeal is constantly made to people’s intuitions about the connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, internalists and externalists disagree considerably about their content. In this paper, we present an empirical study of laymen’s intuitions about this connection. We found that they lend surprisingly little support to the most celebrated versions of internalism, which provide reasons to be skeptical of the evidential basis for these views.
Reprint years
2013
PhilPapers/Archive ID
STRIMI
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-11-30

Total views
1,007 ( #3,110 of 51,740 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #14,824 of 51,740 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.