Perceptual Knowledge of Nonactual Possibilities
Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):363-375 (2015)
Abstract
It is widely assumed that sense perception cannot deliver knowledge of nonactual (metaphysical) possibilities. We are not supposed to be able to know that a proposition p is necessary or that p is possible (if p is false) by sense perception. This paper aims to establish that the role of sense perception is not so limited. It argues that we can know lots of modal facts by perception. While the most straightforward examples concern possibility and contingency, others concern necessity and impossibility. The possibility of a perceptual route to some modal knowledge is not as radical as it may at first sound. On the contrary, acknowledging it has benefits.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2015
PhilPapers/Archive ID
STRPKO
Upload history
Added to PP index
2015-12-14
Total views
816 ( #4,935 of 55,846 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
86 ( #7,368 of 55,846 )
2015-12-14
Total views
816 ( #4,935 of 55,846 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
86 ( #7,368 of 55,846 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.