The Tale of Bella and Creda

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Abstract
Some philosophers defend the view that epistemic agents believe by lending credence. Others defend the view that such agents lend credence by believing. It can strongly appear that the disagreement between them is notational, that nothing of substance turns on whether we are agents of one sort or the other. But that is demonstrably not so. Only one of these types of epistemic agent, at most, could manifest a human-like configuration of attitudes; and it turns out that not both types of agent are possible
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.

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2015-08-20

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