Construct Stabilization and the Unity of the Mind-Brain Sciences

Philosophy of Science 83 (5):662-673 (2016)
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This paper offers a critique of an account of explanatory integration that claims that explanations of cognitive capacities by functional analyses and mechanistic explanations can be seamlessly integrated. It is shown that achieving such explanatory integration requires that the terms designating cognitive capacities in the two forms of explanation are stable but that experimental practice in the mind-brain sciences currently is not directed at achieving such stability. A positive proposal for changing experimental practice so as to promote such stability is put forward and its implications for explanatory integration are briefly considered.
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First archival date: 2015-12-11
Latest version: 3 (2016-11-19)
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