Supererogation, Suberogation, and Maximizing Expected Choiceworthiness

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):418-432 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recently, several philosophers have argued that, when faced with moral uncertainty, we ought to choose the option with the maximal expected choiceworthiness (MEC). This view has been challenged on the grounds that it is implausibly demanding. In response, those who endorse MEC have argued that we should take into account the all-things-considered choiceworthiness of our options. I argue that this gives rise to another problem: acts that we consider to be supererogatory are rendered impermissible, and acts that we consider to be suberogatory are rendered obligatory, under MEC. I suggest a way to reformulate MEC to solve this problem.

Author's Profile

Leora Urim Sung
University College London

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-09-08

Downloads
220 (#90,738)

6 months
141 (#35,692)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?