Related

Contents
3 found
Order:
  1. Within your rights: dissociating wrongness and permissibility in moral judgment.Samuel Murray, William Jiménez-Leal & Santiago Amaya - 2024 - British Journal of Social Psychology 63 (1):340 - 361.
    Are we ever morally permitted to do what is morally wrong? It seems intuitive that we are, but evidence for dissociations among judgment of permissibility and wrongness are relatively scarce. Across 4 experiments (N = 1,438), we show that people judge that some behaviors can be morally wrong and permissible. The dissociations arise because these judgments track different morally relevant aspects of everyday moral encounters. Judgments of individual rights predicted permissibility but not wrongness, while character assessment predicted wrongness but not (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Contrived self‐defense: A case of permissible wrongdoing.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (3):211-220.
    The Philosophical Forum, Volume 52, Issue 3, Page 211-220, Fall 2021.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Suberogation Problem for Lei Zhong's Confucian Virtue Theory of Supererogation.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69 (3):779-784.
    A virtue-based theory of right action aims to explain deontic moral principles in terms of virtue and vice. For example, it may maintain the following account of moral obligation: It is morally obligatory for an agent A to ϕ in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous and relevantly informed person V would characteristically ϕ in C. However, this account faces the so-called supererogation problem. A supererogatory action is an action that is morally praiseworthy but not morally obligatory. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark