A Direct Object of Perception

E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 22 (1):28-36 (2015)
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Abstract

I will use three simple arguments to refute the thesis that I appear to directly perceive a mind-independent material object. The theses I will use are similar to the time-gap argument and the argument from the relativity of perception. The visual object of imagination and the object of experience are in the same place. They also share common qualities such as the content, subjectivity, change in virtue of conditions of observers, and the like. This leads to the conclusion that both a tree-image and a tree-experience are distinct from a material tree. Perception of an object is caused by human nature, the senses and consciousness, and mind may prevent the direct perception of the external world. The strongest objection against that consequence is that there is no extra entity called sense-datum or appearance between a subject-in-itself and a real external thing-in-itself. That is, we see books, not book-images. The possible reply would be that a person sees no mental pictures except that which they see via pictures.

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Mika Suojanen
University of Turku (PhD)

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