Armstrong on Truthmaking and Realism

In Francesco F. Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. De Gruyter. pp. 207-218 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The title of this paper reflects the fact truthmaking is quite frequently considered to be expressive of realism. What this means, exactly, will become clearer in the course of our discussion, but since we are interested in Armstrong’s work on truthmaking in particular, it is natural to start from a brief discussion of how truthmaking and realism appear to be associated in his work. In this paper, special attention is given to the supposed link between truthmaking and realism, but it is argued that this link should not be taken too seriously, as truthmaking turns out to be, to a large extent, ontologically neutral. Some consequences of this are studied.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TAHAOT-2
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 1 (2015-12-09)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Minimal Truthmakers.Donnchadh O'Conaill & Tuomas E. Tahko - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):228-244.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-10-22

Total views
240 ( #10,860 of 37,210 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #11,611 of 37,210 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.