Moderately Naturalistic Metaphysics

Synthese 194 (7):2557-2580 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2016-03-04
Latest version: 2 (2020-04-14)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
1,271 ( #4,095 of 70,005 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
69 ( #11,326 of 70,005 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.