Moderately Naturalistic Metaphysics

Synthese 194 (7):2557-2580 (2017)
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Abstract
The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.
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2017
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TAHMNM
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First archival date: 2016-03-04
Latest version: 1 (2016-03-04)
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