A critical exposition of Isaac Levi's epistemology

Logique Et Analyse 183:447-478 (2003)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The branch of philosophical logic which has become known as “belief change” has, in the course of its development, become alienated from its epistemological origins. However, as formal criteria do not suffice to defend a principled choice between competing systems for belief change, we do need to take their epistemological embedding into account. Here, on the basis of a detailed examination of Isaac Levi's epistemology, we argue for a new direction of belief change research and propose to construct systems for belief change that can do without, but do not rule out, selection functions, in order to enable an *empirical* assessment of the relative merits of competing belief change systems.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TAMACE
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-10-13
View other versions
Added to PP index
2010-07-26

Total views
150 ( #34,745 of 2,439,598 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #45,782 of 2,439,598 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.