Epistemic Vice and Motivation

Metaphilosophy 49 (3):350-367 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This article argues that intellectual character vices involve non-instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves. This view has been the recent target of criticism based on alleged counterexamples presenting epistemically vicious individuals who are virtuously motivated or at least lack suitable epistemically bad motivations. The paper first presents these examples and shows that they do not undermine the motivational approach. Finally, having distinguished motivating from explanatory reasons for belief and action, it argues that our epistemic practice of vice attribution supplies evidence in favour of motivational accounts of vice.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TANEVA
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-06-12
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Vice Epistemology.Cassam, Quassim
Two Distinctions in Goodness.Korsgaard, Christine M.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Deep Epistemic Vices.Kidd, Ian James

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-04-17

Total downloads
58 ( #26,364 of 36,595 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #12,640 of 36,595 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.