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Alessandra Tanesini
Cardiff University
  1.  37
    Intellectual Servility and Timidity.Alessandra Tanesini - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Intellectual servility is a vice opposing proper pride about one's intellectual achievements. Intellectual timidity is also a vice; it is manifested in a lack of proper concern for others’ esteem. This paper offers an account of the nature of these vices and details some of the epistemic harms that flow from them. I argue that servility, which is often the result of suffering humiliation, is a form of damaged self-esteem. It is underpinned by attitudes serving social-adjustive functions and causes ingratiating (...)
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  2. Intellectual Humility as Attitude.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):399-420.
    Intellectual humility, I argue in this paper, is a cluster of strong attitudes directed toward one's cognitive make-up and its components, together with the cognitive and affective states that constitute their contents or bases, which serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. In order to defend this new account of humility I first examine two simpler traits: intellectual self-acceptance of epistemic limitations and intellectual modesty about epistemic successes. The position defended here addresses the shortcomings of both ignorance and accuracy based accounts of (...)
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  3.  36
    Epistemic Vice and Motivation.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):350-367.
    This article argues that intellectual character vices involve non-instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves. This view has been the recent target of criticism based on alleged counterexamples presenting epistemically vicious individuals who are virtuously motivated or at least lack suitable epistemically bad motivations. The paper first presents these examples and shows that they do not undermine the motivational approach. Finally, having distinguished motivating from explanatory reasons for belief and action, it argues that (...)
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  4. "Calm Down, Dear": Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing and Ignorance.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):71-92.
    In this paper I provide an account of two forms of intellectual arrogance which cause the epistemic practices of conversational turn-taking and assertion to malfunction. I detail some of the ethical and epistemic harms generated by intellectual arrogance, and explain its role in fostering the intellectual vices of timidity and servility in other agents. Finally, I show that arrogance produces ignorance by silencing others (both preventing them from speaking and causing their assertions to misfire) and by fostering self-delusion in the (...)
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  5. Nietzsche on the Diachronic Will and the Problem of Morality.Alessandra Tanesini - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):652-675.
    In this paper I offer an innovative interpretation of Nietzsche's metaethical theory of value which shows him to be a kind of constitutivist. For Nietzsche, I argue, valuing is a conative attitude which institutes values, rather than tracking what is independently of value. What is characteristic of those acts of willing which institute values is that they are owned or authored. Nietzsche makes this point using the vocabulary of self-mastery. One crucial feature of those who have achieved this feat, and (...)
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  6.  60
    Teaching Virtue: Changing Attitudes.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):503-527.
    In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.
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  7. Bringing About the Normative Past.Alessandra Tanesini - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):191-206.
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  8. The Non-Conjunctive Nature of Disjunctivism.Alessandra Tanesini - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):95-103.
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  9.  51
    Standpoint Theory Then and Now.Alessandra Tanesini - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. London, UK:
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