À la rescousse du platonisme moral

Dialogue 39 (3):531-556 (2000)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Moral platonism, the claim that moral entities are both objective and prescriptive, is generally thought to be a dead end. In an attempt to defend a moderate form of moral platonism or more precisely platonism about values, I first argue that several of the many versions of this doctrine are not committed to ontological extravagances. I then discuss an important objection due to John McDowell and developed by Michael Smith, according to which moral platonism is incoherent. I argue that objectivism is compatible with the claim that certain ways of being aware of values, namely those involving emotions, are motivating.
ISBN(s)
0012-2173
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TAPLR-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2010-09-25

Total views
436 ( #18,458 of 72,530 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #34,588 of 72,530 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.