À la rescousse du platonisme moral

Dialogue 39 (3):531-556 (2000)
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Moral platonism, the claim that moral entities are both objective and prescriptive, is generally thought to be a dead end. In an attempt to defend a moderate form of moral platonism or more precisely platonism about values, I first argue that several of the many versions of this doctrine are not committed to ontological extravagances. I then discuss an important objection due to John McDowell and developed by Michael Smith, according to which moral platonism is incoherent. I argue that objectivism is compatible with the claim that certain ways of being aware of values, namely those involving emotions, are motivating.
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The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
A Treatise of Human Nature.Hume, David & Lindsay, A. D.

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