Values and Emotions

In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 80-95 (2015)
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Abstract
Evaluative concepts and emotions appear closely connected. According to a prominent account, this relation can be expressed by propositions of the form ‘something is admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in response to it’. The first section discusses various interpretations of such ‘Value-Emotion Equivalences’, for example the Fitting Attitude Analysis, and it offers a plausible way to read them. The main virtue of the proposed way to read them is that it is well-supported by a promising account of emotions, namely the Perceptual Theory of Emotions, which emphasises the analogies between emotions and sensory perceptual experiences. The second section considers a worry about whether concepts such as admirable are really evaluative. It is maintained that even though the arguments used to show that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative can be transposed to affective concepts, these arguments can be resisted. So there is no need to abandon the intuitive claim that affective concepts are inherently evaluative.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
The Varieties of Reference.Antony, Louise M.; Evans, Gareth & McDowell, John
Literal Meaning.Recanati, François
The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value.Rabinowicz, Wlodek & Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni

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Amusement and Beyond.Steinert, Steffen

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