Hegel’in Zihin Fenomenolojisi’nde “Arzu” (Desire) Kavramı Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler

Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 1 (12-13):307-317 (2001)
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Abstract

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, chapter IV, Hegel attempts to show how consciousness becomes self-consciousness. Self-consciousness manifests itself both as the ground on which it makes its object opposite to itself, and as a higher truth by demolishing the otherness of its object in order to preserve it for self-consciousness. Since it presupposes itself as the inner truth (or ground) it realizes itself both as the origin and the aim of desire. In other words, by virtue of presupposing its identity in its dissolution, self-consciousness desires to re-constitute the unity with itself. Therefore, it grasps everything else as a negative object of desire in advance. That is to say, its appearance seems to be an ‘obstacle’ before its satisfaction. However, through experience of negating, self-consciousness learns that its object is also a ‘means’ (i.e., has truth or positive aspect) for its end point. It realizes this latter aspect of its object especially when it is faced with another self-consciousness. At this level, self-consciousness comes to see that there is a counter-balance of opposing powers between itself and the other self-consciousness. This counter-balance leads both self-consciousness to a mutual recognition and, then satisfaction of mutual desires. Therefore, since both the origin and the aim of desire is self-consciousness itself, it (self-consciousness) grasps itself as the positive (real) object of desire and then discerns in the mutual recognition the positive aspect of another which was taken as a negative element before. The satisfaction of desire begins with realizing this positive aspect of another self-consciousness.

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19 Mayis Uni. Faculty of Theology

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