ON THE POSITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSATION IN THE CONTEXT OF IDEA-NATURE RELATIONSHIP: IS THE PRINCIPLE A CATEGORY OF THE MIND OR A TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING THE REGULARITIES OF NATURE?

Flsf Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences (38):1-20 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The principle of causation is a highly significant concept in the philosophy of science. When we contemplate why the events we encounter in nature occur, we discover the existence of this principle. However, should this principle be interpreted as a product of the knowing subject or as a tool for understanding the regularity of nature independent of the subject's mental production? This study will be shaped by the views of two philosophers (Hume and Kant) who have thought about the principle of causation and will argue that the laws of nature, including this principle, serve as a means to comprehend that nature has a regular structure. Based on the premise that nature is orderly and independent of the human mind, such an approach has become more intriguing in contemporary approaches than the approach that transforms causation into a categorical form. While the compatibility of the human mind with the laws of nature seems important for understanding nature, it is evident that such principles would continue to maintain regularity in nature even in the event of the extinction of the human race. The study aims to shape the position of the principle of causation through the concepts of idea and nature, based on the assumption that nature is in regularity and that we can comprehend this regularity through natural laws like causation. At the same time, it provides details on Hume and Kant's understanding of causation. It summarizes the current causation debate in contemporary philosophy of science through the Humean literature. Keywords: Causation, idea, mind, nature, category, Hume, Kant

Author's Profile

Omer Fatih Tekin
Kastamonu University

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-10-26

Downloads
33 (#100,282)

6 months
33 (#98,084)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?