Moral Faith and Moral Reason

In Sophie-Grace Chappell (ed.), Intuition, Theory, Anti-Theory in Ethics. pp. 76-103 (2015)
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Abstract
Robert Adams argues that often our moral commitment outstrips what we are epistemically entitled to believe; in these cases, the virtuous agent doxastic states are instances of “moral faith”. I argue against Adams’ views on the need for moral faith; at least in some cases, our moral “intuitions” provide us with certain moral knowledge. The appearance that there can be no certainty here is the result of dubious views about second-order or indirect doubts. Nonetheless, discussing the phenomena that lead Adams to postulate moral faith brings to light the nature of the epistemic warrant underlying various kinds of moral commitments.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Higher-Order Evidence.Christensen, David

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