Critical-Set Views, Biographical Identity, and the Long Term

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Critical-set views avoid the Repugnant Conclusion by subtracting some constant from the welfare score of each life in a population. These views are thus sensitive to facts about biographical identity: identity between lives. In this paper, I argue that questions of biographical identity give us reason to reject critical-set views and embrace the total view. I end with a practical implication. If we shift our credences towards the total view, we should also shift our efforts towards ensuring that humanity survives for the long term.

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Elliott Thornley
University of Oxford

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