How Should We Feel About Recalcitrant Emotions?

In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility (2022)
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In everyday moral experience, we judge ourselves for our emotional responses. Most of the philosophical literature on recalcitrant emotions focuses on (a) whether and how they are possible or (b) whether and how they are irrational. My interest here is in the ways we blame ourselves for recalcitrant emotions. I aim to show that it is harder than it looks to explain self-blame for recalcitrant emotions. I argue recalcitrance alone does not give us a reason to feel any particular way about our emotions and it is not sufficient grounds for self-blame.
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Archival date: 2022-05-09
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