16 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Krista K. Thomason [10]Krista Thomason [6]
  1. The Moral Risks of Online Shaming.Krista Thomason - 2023 - In Carissa Véliz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    Shaming behavior on social media has been the cause of concern in recent public discourse. Supporters of online shaming argue that it is an important tool in helping to make social media and online communities safer and more welcoming to traditionally marginalized groups. Objections to shaming often sound like high-minded calls for civility, but I argue that shaming behavior poses serious risks. Here I identify moral and political risks of online shaming. In particular, shaming threatens to undermine our commitment to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Shame, Violence, and Morality.Krista K. Thomason - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):1-24.
    Shame is most frequently defined as the emotion we feel when we fail to live up to standards, norms, or ideals. I argue that this definition is flawed because it cannot explain some of the most paradigmatic features of shame. Agents often respond to shame with violence, but if shame is the painful feeling of failing to live up to an ideal, this response is unintelligible. I offer a new account of shame that can explain the link between shame and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  3. Shame, Gender, and Self-Making.Krista Thomason - 2023 - In Raffaele Rodogno & Alessandra Fussi (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Shame. Moral Psychology of the Emotions. pp. 205-220.
    Although moral philosophers have argued that shame is a valuable moral emotion, feminist philosophers have been skeptical. From the feminist perspective, shame appears to be an emotion more mediated by social circumstances than moral philosophers acknowledge. It is, they will argue, not an accident that shame occurs more frequently in people with marginalized identities. If who I am is a social subordinate, this would explain why women feel more shame. This argument relies on the assumption that the reason women feel (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. The Moral Value of Envy.Krista K. Thomason - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):36-53.
    It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  5. A Good Enough Heart: Kant and the Cultivation of Emotions.Krista K. Thomason - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (3):441-462.
    One way of understanding Kant’s views about moral emotions is the cultivation view. On this view, emotions play a role in Kantian morality provided they are properly cultivated. I evince a sceptical position about the cultivation view. First, I show that the textual evidence in support of cultivation is ambiguous. I then provide an account of emotions in Kant’s theory that explains both his positive and negative views about them. Emotions capture our attention such that they both disrupt the mind’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  6. Shame and Contempt in Kant's Moral Theory.Krista K. Thomason - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (2):221-240.
    Attitudes like shame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality. Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object of shame and contempt is not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  7. How Should We Feel About Recalcitrant Emotions?Krista Thomason - 2022 - In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    In everyday moral experience, we judge ourselves for our emotional responses. Most of the philosophical literature on recalcitrant emotions focuses on (a) whether and how they are possible or (b) whether and how they are irrational. My interest here is in the ways we blame ourselves for recalcitrant emotions. I aim to show that it is harder than it looks to explain self-blame for recalcitrant emotions. I argue recalcitrance alone does not give us a reason to feel any particular way (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Above All Things Human: Bestimmung in Salomo Friedlaender’s Kant for Children.Krista K. Thomason - 2024 - In Salomo Friedlaender (ed.), Kant for Children. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 121-140. Translated by Bruce Krajewski.
    Kant’s commitment to universalism has been called into question since increasing attention has been paid to his work on race in the last 20 years. This worry can easily be applied to Kant’s work on education: when Kant describes education as allowing humanity to fulfill its Bestimmung (vocation), scholars might reasonably conclude that such a claim only applies certain racial groups. Yet Salomo Friedlaender claims that if Kant’s moral theory is taught to children, “Every person is valued according to her (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. The Symbol of Justice: Bloodguilt in Kant.Krista K. Thomason - 2021 - Kantian Review 26 (1):79-97.
    One of the more notorious passages in Kant occurs in the Doctrine of Right where he claims that ‘bloodguilt’ will cling to members of a dissolving society if they fail to execute the last murderer (MM, 6: 333). Although this is the most famous, bloodguilt appears in three other passages in Kant’s writings. These have received little attention in Kant scholarship. In this article, I examine these other passages and argue that bloodguilt functions as a symbol for the demandingness of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Wild chimeras: Enthusiasm and intellectual virtue in Kant.Krista K. Thomason - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):380-393.
    Kant typically is not identified with the tradition of virtue epistemology. Although he may not be a virtue epistemologist in a strict sense, I suggest that intellectual virtues and vices play a key role in his epistemology. Specifically, Kant identifies a serious intellectual vice that threatens to undermine reason, namely enthusiasm (Schwärmerei). Enthusiasts become so enamored with their own thinking that they refuse to subject reason to self-critique. The particular danger of enthusiasm is that reason colludes in its own destruction: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. I’ll Show You: Spite as a Reactive Attitude.Krista K. Thomason - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):163-175.
    Spite is typically considered a vicious emotion that causes us to engage in petty, vindictive, and sometimes self-destructive behavior. Even though it has this bad reputation, I will argue that spite is a reactive attitude. Spite is emotional defiance of another’s command: to spite you, I will do something exactly because you told me not to. Our liability to feelings of spite presupposes that we recognize others as having practical authority, which is why it qualifies as a reactive attitude. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. The Moral Necessity of Anger.Krista Thomason - 2020 - In Court D. Lewis & Gregory L. Bock (eds.), The Ethics of Anger. Lexington Books. pp. 83-101.
    Moral philosophers have defended anger as an important part of our moral lives. In spite of these defenses, skeptics have nonetheless argued that it would be better all things considered to get over anger to the extent that we can. They will often point to moral exemplars like Martin Luther King, Jr. or Gandhi to show both (a) that we can successfully overcome our feelings of anger and (b) that we would be morally better off doing so. In this chapter, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Alienated Emotions and Self-Knowledge.Krista Thomason - 2023 - In Alba Montes Sánchez & Alessandro Salice (eds.), Emotional Self-Knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 39-55.
    Our emotions can be revealing. They can not only reflect our character traits and our judgments, but they can also tell us things about ourselves that we do not fully realize or may not want to admit. In this chapter, I am particularly interested in how we relate to what I will call alienated emotions: emotional experiences that are unusual, surprising, or even disturbing. What, if anything, do our alienated emotions tell us about who we are? I argue here that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Forgiveness or Fairness?Krista K. Thomason - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (2):233-260.
    Several philosophers who argue that forgiveness is an important virtue also wish to maintain the moral value of retributive emotions that forgiveness is meant to overcome. As such, these accounts explicate forgiveness as an Aristotelian mean between too much resentment and too little resentment. I argue that such an account ends up making forgiveness superfluous: it turns out that the forgiving person is not praised for a greater willingness to let go of her resentment, but rather for her fairness or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. The Philosopher's Medicine of the Mind: Kant's Account of Mental Illness and the Normativity of Thinking.Krista Thomason - 2021 - In Ansgar Lyssy & Christopher Yeomans (eds.), Kant on Morality, Humanity, and Legality: Practical Dimensions of Normativity. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 189-206.
    Kant’s conception of mental illness is unlikely to satisfy contemporary readers. His classifications of mental illness are often fluid and ambiguous, and he seems to attribute to human beings at least some responsibility for preventing mental illness. In spite of these apparent disadvantages, I argue that Kant’s account of mental illness can be illuminating to his views about the normative dimensions of human cognition. In contrast to current understandings of mental illness, Kant’s account is what I refer to as “non-pathological.” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Guilt and Child Soldiers.Krista K. Thomason - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):115-127.
    The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of guilt that child (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation