Permissive Metaepistemology

Mind 128 (511):907-926 (2019)
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Recent objections to epistemic permissivism have a metaepistemic flavor. Impermissivists argue that their view best accounts for connections between rationality, planning and deference. Impermissivism is also taken to best explain the value of rational belief and normative assessment. These objections pose a series of metaepistemic explanatory challenges for permissivism. In this paper, I illustrate how permissivists might meet their explanatory burdens by developing two permissivist metaepistemic views which fare well against the explanatory challenges.
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First archival date: 2018-10-21
Latest version: 2 (2018-10-21)
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References found in this work BETA
The Enigma of Reason.Sperber, Dan & Mercier, Hugo
Epistemic Modals.Yalcin, Seth
Ifs and Oughts.Kolodny, Niko & MacFarlane, John

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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Jackson, Elizabeth & Turnbull, Margaret Greta

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