Shame, Gender, and Self-Making

In Raffaele Rodogno & Alessandra Fussi (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Shame. Moral Psychology of the Emotions. pp. 205-220 (2023)
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Abstract

Although moral philosophers have argued that shame is a valuable moral emotion, feminist philosophers have been skeptical. From the feminist perspective, shame appears to be an emotion more mediated by social circumstances than moral philosophers acknowledge. It is, they will argue, not an accident that shame occurs more frequently in people with marginalized identities. If who I am is a social subordinate, this would explain why women feel more shame. This argument relies on the assumption that the reason women feel more shame is because they internalize negative social judgments about themselves. Although this explanation is tempting, in this chapter I want to evince a skeptical position against it. I want to put pressure on the claim that women internalize their oppression and that this process explains their shame. Instead, I argue that their shame can be explained by the difficulties of navigating one’s identity under conditions of oppression.

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Krista Thomason
Swarthmore College

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