A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism

Synthese 191 (16):3919-3934 (2014)
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Abstract
In this paper I present a psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism, the thesis that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state rather than a nonconceptual state. The argument draws on the holistic character of functionalist accounts of mind, together with the “Two Visual Systems Hypothesis” notably defended by Melvyn Goodale and David Milner
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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A Study of Concepts.PEACOCKE, Christopher

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2014-06-17

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