A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism

Synthese 191 (16):3919-3934 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I present a psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism, the thesis that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state rather than a nonconceptual state. The argument draws on the holistic character of functionalist accounts of mind, together with the “Two Visual Systems Hypothesis” notably defended by Melvyn Goodale and David Milner
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TIEAPA
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2014-06-17

Total views
344 ( #15,783 of 56,895 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #23,397 of 56,895 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.