Expressivism, Anti-Archimedeanism and Supervenience

Res Publica 20 (2):163-181 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Metaethics is traditionally understood as a non-moral discipline that examines moral judgements from a standpoint outside of ethics. This orthodox understanding has recently come under pressure from anti-Archimedeans, such as Ronald Dworkin and Matthew Kramer, who proclaim that rather than assessing morality from an external perspective, metaethical theses are themselves substantive moral claims. In this paper, I scrutinise this anti-Archimedean challenge as applied to the metaethical position of expressivism. More precisely, I examine the claim that expressivists do not avoid moral commitments when accounting for moral thought, but instead presuppose them; they do not look at ethics from the outside, but operate from within ethics. This paper defends the non-moral status of expressivism against anti-Archimedeanism by rejecting a new anti-Archimedean challenge which, on the basis of Hume’s Law, aims to exploit expressivist explanations of supervenience in order to show that expressivism is a substantive moral position.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TIEEAA
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-11-04
View other versions
Added to PP index
2014-02-27

Total views
155 ( #30,737 of 56,916 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #31,125 of 56,916 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.